


IV^ 



GREAT BRITAIN AND THE WAR 



BY 



A. MAURICE LOW. M. A. 

Washington Correspondent of the London Morning Post 
Author of " The Americiin People, a Study in National Psychology 



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7 V , 



GREAT BRITAIN AND THE WAR* 



In a recent interview given by Count von Bernstorff, the German Am- 
bassador, he based his defence of Germany's position upon these asser- 
tions : — 

1. That Russia provoked the war, 

2. That had Russia not been certain of the support of Great Britain 
she would not have made war upon Austria. 

3. That, Austria having been forced into war, Germany was com- 
pelled by her treaty engagements to come to the support of her ally. 

4. That England, because of her jealousy and enmity of Germany, 
encouraged both Russia and France to make war on Austria and Ger- 
many, although England had no cause to be jealous of Germany. 

Having thus proved to his own satisfaction that Germany is the help- 
less victim of British duplicity and Russian brutality and French ma- 
lignity. Count Bernstorff wonders why the preponderating sympathy 
of America is with England and her Allies and against Germany and 
Austria. 

Documents Tell the Story 

I shall not attempt to answer the first assertion, because it is unneces- 
sary. Every one who has read the British and German official diplomatic 
correspondence knows the truth. To that correspondence Count Bern- 

*Reprinted, in response to many requests, from the New York Herald, of 
September 21, 1914. 

The discussion of the so-called German "peace proposals" has since been 
added. 



2 GREAT BRITAIN AND THE WAR 

storff can add nothing and from it I can subtract notliing. That corre- 
spondence requires neither explanation nor elucidation. It shows pre- 
cisely what the British government did in its attempts to prevent war ; 
it shows wihat Count Bernstorff's sovereign failed to do to curb his ally. 
If that correspondence does not convince the reader certainly nothing 
that Count Bernstorff can say will alter his opinion ; nothing that I might 
write will influence any person's calm judgment. Those telegrams that 
passed between ministers and ambassadors in the fateful days of July 
are now history, and to the judgment of history they may be safely left. 

Count Bernstorff asserts that if Russia had not been certain of the 
support of England she would not have forced war upon Austria. The 
tu quoquc is the weakest form of argument. Nevertheless I feel justified 
in asking if Austria had not felt absolutely certain of the support of Ger- 
many would she have challenged Russia? The answer is obvious. Single 
handed Austria is no match for Russia. Count Bernstorff knows that ; 
the professional advisers of the Austrian Emperor knew it. The mili- 
tary resources of Russia are so incornparably superior to those of Austria 
that only a desperate gambler, willing to put his crown on the table as the 
stakes, would have risked the throw of the cards. And Austria did 
not have a free hand. She was hampered on her flank by Servia, a little 
nation, but so powerful that Austria's ill-starred campaign against her 
has collapsed. Austria could not disguise the menace of Bosnia and Her- 
zegovina. She had violated the treaty of Berlin when she absorbed, 
them into her empire in pursuance of her "civilizing mission," and their 
people looked for the day when they might throw off the Austrian yoke. 

But I do not rely on assertion. For ten days prior to July 31 Sir Ed- 
ward Grey, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had la- 
bored day and night to prevent war. On that day he sent a telegram to 
Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador in Berlin, expressing the 
hope that the conversations then proceeding between Austria and Russia 
would lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling block hitherto, he 
explained, had been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances and Russian 
mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and in- 
tegrity of Servia. In order to overcome these suspicions Sir Edward Grey 
suggested Germany might sound Vienna and he would agree to sound St. 
Petersburg whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers 
— Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain — to offer to Austria that she 
should obtain full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided they 
did not impair Servian sovereignty and Servian integrity, Austria already 






GREAT BRITAIN AND THE WAR 3 

having declared her wilhngness to respect them; and Russia would be 
informed that the four disinterested Powers would undertake to prevent 
Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian sovereignty and 
integrity, and he added; — 

"I said to the German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could 
get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany 
and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia 
and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support 
it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia 
and France would not accept it His Majesty's government would have 
nothing more to do with the consequences ; but otherwise I told the Ger- 
man Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in." 
In the light of the above can any honest man say that Russia felt certain 
of the support of Great Britain? As a matter of fact, neither Russia nor 
France was sure of what Great Britan would do, and her course was to be 
governed solely by whether they were "reasonable." What Sir Edward 
Grey wanted above and beyond everything else was to preserve the peace 
of Europe, and to accomplish that, to save the world from the horrors it is 
now experiencing, he was willing to throw the great influence of England 
on the side of Germany and Austria if they were sincerely working for 
peace and to leave France and Russia to their fate if they were unreason- 
able and determined to provoke war. 

Further confirmation, if any is needed, that neither France nor Russia 
knew what England would do and that she did not declare her position 
until circumstances forced her to take up arms is to be found. On that 
same day, July 31, the French Ambassador in London was trying to in- 
duce British support of France in case she was attacked by Germany 
and was urging Sir Edward Grey to promise to come to the assistance of 
France. But Sir Edward Grey would make no promise. There were cir- 
cumstances, he explained, that might prevent England from remaining 
neutral and force her into the war as the ally of France, but he could 
enter into no engagement. On August 1 the British Ambassador in 
Vienna telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey, "There is great anxiety to know 
what England will do." Austrian anxiety was shared by Russia. Thus 
as late as the first of August neither of Britain's subsequent Allies, Rus- 
sia and France, nor one of her soon to be foes, Austria, knew what Eng- 
land would do. 

And yet Count Bernstorfi^ says the war would not have happened had 
not Russia been certain of the support of England. 



4 GREAT BRITAIN AND THE WAR 

What about Germany? Did she feel certain what England would do? 
The correspondence is of peculiar interest as tending to controvert the 
German Ambassador's assertion that Germany was dragged into war. 
From the beginning of the critical relations between Austria and Russia, 
owing to the despatch of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, Sir Edward 
Grey had regarded the matter as a quarrel between Austria and Servia in 
which the other European Powers were not concerned. He knew, of 
course, of the Austro-German alliance, as he knew of the Franco-Russian 
alliance, but he saw no reason why those alliances should be invoked. 
Germany and France he considered "disinterested" Powers and placed 
them in the same category as Italy, also the ally of Germany and Austria, 
and England, neither the ally of Russia or France, but who might be 
compelled to support France and Russia under certain circumstances. If 
Russia and Austria must fight. Sir Edward Grey held, it was bad enough, 
but that was better than to see the whole of Europe at war. Germany 
was not bound to come to the support of Austria unless she was deter- 
mined to force France into the war ; France need not go to the assistance 
of Russia unless she was looking for a casus belli against Germany. 

France had joined with England in using her influence with Russia to 
keep the peace. France had given no provocation to Germany. On July 
29 Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey he had been 
invited that evening to call upon the Chancellor, who said that if Austria 
was attacked by Russia Germany would be compelled to come to her as- 
sistance. Provided that the neutrality of Great Britain were certain, 
every assurance would be given to the British government that Germany 
aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France. Sir Edward 
Goschen asked what about the French colonies, but the Chancellor said 
that he "was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect." 

As for Belgium — whose neutrality it will be remembered Germany had 
guaranteed — "it depended upon the action of France what operations 
Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war 
was over Belgium integrity would be respected if she had not sided against 
Germany." As a further bid for English neutrality the Chancellor added, 
with almost childlike simplicity, as if vague promises in the future counted 
for anything in an emergency so great,, "he had in mind a general neu- 
trality agreement between England and Germany, though of course it 
was at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance 
of British neutrality in the conflict which the present crisis might pro- 
duce would enable him to look forward to the realization of his desire." 



GREAT BRITAIN AND THE WAR 5 

And Count von Bernstorff would ask the American people to believe 
that Germany was trying to avoid war with France. 

Sir Edward Grey's reply was spirited and to the point. There is noth- 
ing finer in the entire correspondence. It exhibits the Secretary of State 
indignant at the offer of a bribe, but still trying to preserve peace and 
showing Germany how that could be done. 

Sir Edward telegraphed the next day to the British Ambassador: — 

"His Majesty's government cannot for a moment entertain the Chan- 
cellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such 
terms. 

"What he asks us is in effect to engage to stand by while French colo- 
nies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take 
French territory as distinct from the colonies. 

"From a material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for 
France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could 
be so crushed as to lose her position as a great Power and become sub- 
ordinate to German policy. 

"Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this 
bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which 
the good name of this country would never recover. 

"The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obliga- 
tion of interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could 
not entertain that bargain, either." 

Having rejected the bribe offered by Germany, having with dignity and 
restraint repudiated the suggestion that Great Britain could remain pas- 
sive while France was being crushed to satisfy the overweening ambi- 
tion of Germany, Sir Edward Grey still showed that the one thing of all 
others he desired was peace, and he pointed out the way by which that 
object might be attained. He instructed his Ambassador to say to the 
Chancellor : — 

"One way of maintaining good relations between England and Ger- 
many is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace 
of Europe. If we succeed in this object the mutual relations of Germany 
and England will, I believe, be, ipse facto, improved and strengthened. 
For that object His Majesty's government will work in that way with all 
sincerity and good will." 

Is this the language or the act of a man trying to entice Russia into 
making war on Germany? 

Sir Edward Grey was to give still further proof of his sincerity and his 



6 GREAT BRITAIN AND THE WAR 

almost fanatical attachment to the cause of peace. In that same despatch 
to Sir Edward Goschen he continued : — 

"And I will say this: — If the peace of Europe can be preserved and 
the present crisis safely passed my own endeavor will be to promote some 
arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be 
assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her 
or her allies by France, Russia and ourselves, jointly or separately." 

Could anything be more straightforward, more binding, than this volun- 
tary pledge? For years Germany has told the world that she was not 
seeking war, that her enormous army and her powerful navy, rapidly ri- 
valling that of Great Britain, were safeguards of peace and to prevent 
France and Russia from attacking her. Sir Edward Grey bound himself 
to bring about an arrangement by which Germany would be assured she 
need have no fear of the hostility of France, Russia or Great Britain. 
Had Germany been sincere in her protestations that she was ready to de- 
fend herself, but reluctant to provoke her neighbors, she would eagerly 
have accepted Sir Edward Grey's offer, but, as Sir Edward Goschen re- 
ported, the Chancellor received the communication "without comment." 

And Count von Bernstorff imposes upon American intelligence by try- 
ing to have it believed that Great Britain was persuading Russia to go to 
war. 

Germany Began the War 
Count von Bernstorff asserts that Germany did not begin the war. It 
is not material who strikes the first blow when two men are determined 
to quarrel, but for the vindication of history the facts should not be gar- 
bled. On August 2, before Russia, France or Great Britain had com- 
mitted a single act of hostility against Germany, she violated the neu- 
trality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. On the preceding day Sir 
Edward Grey had telegraphed Sir Edward Goschen that the authorities at 
Hamburg had forcibly detained British merchant ships, and he requested 
that the German government send immediate orders for the release of 
the vessels, as the effect on public opinion would be deplorable unless that 
was done. The British government, he added, was most anxious to avoid 
any incident of an aggressive nature, and he hoped the German govern- 
ment would be equally careful not to take any step which would make the 
situation impossible. These vessels were released the next day after their 
cargoes had been forcibly seized, an act that Sir Edward Grey protested 
against. 



GREAT BRITAIN AND THE WAR 7 

On August 3 the German government sent an ultimatum to Belgium 
demanding free passage for her troops and threatening to use force if 
the request was refused. Sir Edward Grey protested against Germany 
violating Belgian neutrality, which Germany, in common with England, 
had guaranteed. On August 4 the German government informed the 
Belgian government that it would enter Belgium, "in view of the French 
menaces." For the first time Germany used the fear of France as a 
pretext for war. Hitherto she had pretended Russia was a menace ; now 
she suddenly discovered it was France that threatened. On that same 
day Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir Edward Goschen that he con- 
tinued to receive numerous complaints from British firms of the detention 
of their ships at Hambug, Cuxhaven and other Geman ports. This action, 
Sir Edward declared, was totally unjustifiable and in direct contravention 
of international law and of the assurances given by the Imperial Chan- 
cellor. 

Thus Germany had thrice oflfended against the law of nations and the 
moral law. She had violated the neutrality of Luxemburg, whose neu- 
trality she had guaranteed. She had violated the neutrality of Belgium, 
whose neutrality she had agreed to respect. She had seized British ves- 
sels and their cargoes while Great Britain and Germany were still at 
peace. 

Count von Bernstorff, speaking as German Ambassador to the United 
States, asserts that Germany did not strike the first blow. 

Having thus exposed a few of the errors into which the German Am- 
bassador has been unconsciously betrayed in dealing with the pKDiitical 
phases of this wanton war, attention may be usefully called to some of 
His Excellency's lapses when he discusses the psychology of American 
public sentiment. He mounfully recognizes the fact that American senti- 
ment is hostile to Germany and explains it by saying that almost imme- 
diately after the declaration of hostilities England cut the German transat- 
lantic cable, so that the United States should be misinformed as to the 
truth and only news passing through London and Paris could reach 
America. 

This is childish. The cable was cut as a military measure, as Count 
von Bernstorff very well knows, and for no other reason. The Ameri- 
can people have the news and the truth ; they get the news in their news- 
papers and the truth they can find by reading the German and British 
White Papers, which have been published in this country. They have 
heard the truth about the destruction of Louvain, the slaughter of women 



8 GREAT BRITAIN AND THE WAR 

and children in Antwerp, the scattering of mines in the North Sea and 
the tribute exacted from Brussels and Liege in defiance of the humane 
spirit of the age. The German Ambassador ought not to regret that the 
cutting of the cable has made it difficult for news to reach America ; rather 
he ought to pray that other cables may be quickly cut, so that no further 
knowledge of German atrocities can reach the United States. 

Count von Bernstorfif professes not to be able to understand English 
enmity and cannot find any justification for it, although he acknowledges 
England has long been jealous of Germany's increasing prosperity and 
her growing navy. It is curious what tricks memory plays. For years 
Germany — not her people or individuals, but her officials and governing 
classes — has shown its dislike of England and offensively rattled the sabre 
in the sound of English ears. There was the Kaiser's telegram to Kruger, 
for instance ; the obscene insults to the late Queen during the Boer war the 
Kaiser's sneers and slurs at King Edward, the crisis precipitated over 
Agadir and the revenge he took in making France dismiss Delcasse. 

It was these things and hundreds of others that made it so difficult for 
the well wishers and friends of Germany in England — and I have no 
apology to make for counting myself as one of them — to use their influ- 
ence, much or little as the case might be, to bring about better relations 
with Germany. There is no military party in England. England, with 
the sole exception of the United States, is the one great Power that is not 
subordinate to the military. No Englishman wanted to go to war with 
Germany. No Englishman could see that there was anything to be gained 
by war with Germany. Time after time Germany gave us provocation and 
we kept our temper. Those of us who believe that war is usually a crime, 
the most insensate act nations can commit, believed that the German 
Emperor was too sensible of his obligations to his people and posterity, 
too wise not to recognize the desperate risk he took in plunging Europe 
into war when the honor of his country was not impugned nor national 
safety endangered. 

The fact is the Kaiser held all too lightly the military power of Great 
Britain, He is an autocrat, a militarist, and therefore he cannot under- 
stand the aspirations and the motives of a democracy. That a country 
so powerful as Great Britain, with a world-flung Empire, should content 
itself with a standing army insignificant compared with the millions Ger- 
many is abe to call to the colors ; that it should rely for its defence on 
volunteers instead of resorting to conscription; that the civil and not the 
military power should be supreme — these things to the Kaiser were in- 



GREAT BRITAIN AND THE WAR 9 

congruous and were to be explained only on the theory that England was 
a decaying nation, that the England of the Napoleonic wars had lost its 
virility, that, engrossed in money making and trade, it had become steeped 
in luxury and enjoyment and was either too cowardly or too indifferent to 
fight. And accepting that as a premise, it is easy to see how he reached 
his conclusion — England would not fight ; England was not to be feared. 

Part of the Kaiser's reasoning was correct. England does not want to 
fight, but the mistake the Kaiser made was in believing that England would 
not fight. She will fight, as the Kaiser has learned to his cost, when honor 
is at stake and when not to fight would be, as Sir Edward Grey said, "a 
disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover." 
She might have escaped war had she been content to see Belgium outraged 
and the plighted fate of nations mocked and the covenants between peo- 
ples broken by dismissing a treaty as "only a scrap of paper;" she could 
have imitated the example of Italy and found a pretext for deserting her 
allies ; she might have bought immunity by accepting the insincere prom- 
ises of Germany and claiming she had given greater assistance to France 
through her diplomacy than she could render by force of arms. These 
things England might have done. These things England would have done 
if the Kaiser's estimate of the English character had not been founded 
on false premises. But these things England did not do. Forced to fight, 
she has fought, because there are times when a nation, similar to an indi- 
vidual who loves peace and abhors a brawl, must either defend himself 
or in shame no longer dare claim kinship of his fellows. 

It does not become the German Ambassador to accuse England of being 
jealous of Germany's prosperity. While Germany has built a wall of 
tariffs against England, England has thrown the doors to- her market 
places wide open. She has shown no hostility to the legend "Made in Ger- 
many." A commercial nation — and commerce is England's strength — 
does not go to war to overthrow competition, because no one knows bet- 
ter than the banker and the merchant and the trader that war does not 
pay. Germany found in the United Kingdom and the British dominions 
and dependencies her richest and most profitable market, and through her 
own folly Germany has lost a trade she can never recover. 

In two weeks after the declaration of war the German merchant ma- 
rine, the pride of the Kaiser's heart, had virtually disappeared from the 
seven seas. German merchant vessels, from the magnificent Imperator 
and Vaterland down to the disruptable looking tramps, all the shipping 
that so proudly flew the German flag on the Atlantic and the Pacific, on 



10 GREAT BRITAIN AND THE WAR 

the main travelled routes as well as in remote places where a cargo is to be 
up or goods made in Germany can find a purchaser, is either interned in 
neutral ports or tied up in German harbors or condemned as lawful prize 
by the British courts. 

The German navy, which was the challenge of Gennany to Britain on 
the seas, the greatest provocation one nation ever gave to another, which 
the German Emperor fondly imagined would make him as supreme on 
the sea as he imagined he was invincible on land, has been compelled to 
seek the security of its fortified bases. While British ships go about their 
ordinary business, while the great transatlantic lines under the British 
flag are running on their regular schedules, while cargoes of foodstuffs 
and other commodities are flowing in a never ending stream from Ameri- 
can ports eastward and the current runs undisturbed in the reverse direc- 
tion and British goods find their accustomed markets, Germany is begin- 
ning to feel the pinch of hunger, German industries are prostrate, Ger- 
man commerce is paralyzed. 

It is these things that make Germany so bitter against England. They 
explain why Count von Bernstorff seeks to throw the responsibility upon 
England and hopes to gain American sympathy. He frankly admits that 
he is amazed by "the general hostility of the American press." The 
American press — and I think I speak with exact knowledge — has not been 
hostile, but it has been just. It has not been partisan, but it has pro- 
nounced judgment. On the evidence submitted it has rendered decision. 
Before the great bar of conscience the Kaiser has been brought to his 
assize. History has rendered its verdict. Without cause he provoked a 
war ; to gratify ambition he sowed desolation. Little children he has made 
fatherless, and brides to mourn their husbands. The tears of the living 
and the blood of the dying drench Europe. His legions have marched, 
and with them have gone ruin, death, horror. He has spared neither 
young nor old. He has spread the torch and with flame and sword 
devasted city and plain. He has made the world a house of mourning; 
he has stricken down the firstborn and brought sorrow to the aged. He 
has made honor a jest and the word of a King a thing of scorn. He has 
invoked the name of God and defiled man made in the image of his 
Maker. Under his iron heel he has crushed civilization and checked its 
progress. 

Knowing the truth, it would be amazing if the American press and the 
American people were able to withhold their sympathy from the nations 
forced by Germany to defend themselves. 



GREAT BRITAIN AND THE WAR 11 

Does Germany Want Peace? 

Since the above was written there have been numerous articles in the 
newspapers intimating that Germany was willing to make peace, and the 
German Ambassador has endeavored to make the American people be- 
lieve that while Germany is ready to end the war. Great Britain and her 
Allies prefer to fight rather than to restore peace to the world and end 
its toll of blood and misery. 

On September 6 Mr. Oscar S. Straus, a member of the Hague Per- 
manent Tribunal of Arbitration, came to Washington and told Secretary 
Bryan he believed that the German Emperor would be willing to con- 
sider terms of peace. Mr. Straus had met Count Bernstorflf at a dinner 
in New York, and had been given to understand by him that Germany 
would be glad to have the United States exercise its good offices to bring 
hostilities to an end. Mr. Straus asked the consent of the German Am- 
bassador to repeat the conversation to Mr. Bryan, and was permitted 
to do so. 

Mr. Straus saw Mr. Bryan and was authorized by him to call on the 
British and French Ambassadors and ascertain from them the views of 
their Governments. Both Ambassadors informed Mr. Straus that they 
had received no instructions on the subject, but they would communicate 
any proposal made to them. For the benefit of the reader unfamiliar with 
the forms of diplomacy, it should be explained that an Ambassador can- 
not bind his Government without specific instructions, and can only act 
in accordance with the instructions he has received from his Foreign 
Minister. The British and French Ambassadors informed Mr. Straus 
that their Governments desired peace, as they always had, but it must be 
no temporary truce ; it must be peace made under such conditions that it 
would be a lasting peace, and Great Britain, France and Russia could 
feel certain they would not again be suddenly attacked. 

Mr. Bryan had in the meantime asked Count Bernstorff to come to 
Washington so that he could ascertain whether he had been authorised 
by the German Emperor to seek the good offices of the United States. 
Count Bernstorff admitted he had received no instructions. His conver- 
sation with Mr. Straus was based on his own belief that the German 
Emperor was not adverse to peace. Mr. Bryan asked Count Bernstorff 
if he had any objection to Mr. Gerard, the American Ambassador to 
Germany, ascertaining whether the German Government would accept 
an offer, of mediation made through the United States. To this Count 
Bernstorff assented. 

The British and French Ambassadors at once communicated the sub- 



12 GREAT BRITAIN AND THE WAR 

stance of Mr. Straus' conversation to their respective Governments. Sir 
Edward Grey, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, speak- 
ing for England as well as her Allies, confirmed in effect what Sir Cecil 
Spring Rice, the British Ambassador, had informally said to Mr. Straus. 
It was that Great Britain desired peace, but it must be a lasting peace. 
If Germany had terms to offer that would effectually insure peace the 
Allied Powers would receive and consider them. 

Germany having taken the first steps it was incumbent upon her, if she 
was sincere and acting in good faith, to make known the terms she pro- 
posed. If she was not sincere, if Count Bernstorff, with or without 
instructions, was simply "fishing," hoping to learn that the Allies were 
discouraged and disheartened and would welcome peace at any price, 
the purpose would have been served and the United States would be told 
that Germany had no terms to offer. 

The reader will be able to form his own conclusions as to Count Bern- 
storff's sincerity and the good faith of Germany. 

Mr. Gerard in due course saw the German Imperial Chancellor, who 
had the eft'rontery — not to use a harsher word — to say that "the United 
States ought to get proposals of peace from the Allies." When Mr. Ger- 
ard's report was made to the President, Mr. Wilson saw that it was 
useless to press the matter further. 

If Germany had been sincere, if in good faith she had wanted peace, 
the Chancellor would not have banged the door in the face of the United 
States. 

It is only necessary to say a few words regarding the present position 
of Great Britain and her Allies. England desires peace, sincerely and 
ardently she longs for peace, but it must be no sham peace, no mockery of 
the word. 

If ever a nation fought the battle of the world, fought for liberty and 
in the cause of righteousness, that nation is England. She is today doing 
what she did a hundred years ago when she rid the world of the menace 
of a military despot and saved Europe from coming under the dominion 
of one man. She stands today the bulwark against militarism and a mili- 
tary oligarchy. She stands today for liberty, freedom of thought and 
action; the subordination of the sword to the rule of law. She stands 
today the champion of Democracy, the right of man to be "sole sponsor 
of himself." If she is crippled or crushed, the dam that holds back mili- 
tarism is swept away. For many years Europe has been an armed camp. 
Should England cease to be a Great Power all Europe will be divided 



GREAT BRITAIN AND THE WAR 13 

into two parts — Germany and the rest, military satrapies governed by 
an autocrat in Berlin, arrogating to himself the divine right to govern. 

There will no longer be any "little nations," Belgium, Switzerland, Hol- 
land, Denmark, Sweden, Norway will be robbed of their nationality and 
independence, their national aspirations, their manner and customs, their 
ideals, their memories of the past, their hopes of the future. They will 
be ground under the iron heel of Germany, conquered provinces, their 
people valuable only as increasing the power of German military autoc- 
racy, an autocracy that will not be satisfied with having enslaved Europe 
but will seek the conquest of other worlds so that Democracy may perish 
from the face of the earth and absolutism be the creed of kings. 

This war is not of England's seeking. She has been forced into it, and 
having been forced into it she will not relinquish the sword until it can 
be sheathed with safety. Resolutely, with grim determination the British 
Empire is determined there shall be an end of militarism. Too long has 
the world lain under the grievous curse of its armed hosts. Too long 
has the terror of war threatened. Too long has the corruption of the 
sword worked. 

England has not gone into this war with a light heart. There are today 
no light hearts in England, in Scotland, in Ireland, in any place where 
the British flag flies. But whatever the cost, whatever the sacrifice, we 
must see this thing through, we must save civilization from a return to 
barbarism, from the shame of reverting to the day when justice was 
unknown and only strength was feared. 

Were England to make peace now, to make peace on such terms as 
the German Emperor would only too willingly accept, she would be for- 
ever disgraced and deserve the contempt of all mankind. England has 
taken upon herself a very solemn duty — the preservation of the national 
existence of Belgium against the rapacity of Germany. The most virulent 
enemy of England, of France, of Russia has for Belgium only admiration; 
profound admiration for her courage, profound pity for the ruin and 
desolation that have moved the compassion of the world. 

Accident involved Belgium. She was the ally of none of the com- 
batants. She was not concerned in the jealousies or intrigues of the 
Powers. She had no revenge to satisfy; no long standing debt of hate 
to settle. She ofifered no provocation. She was peacefully pursuing her 
own afifairs, her people happy and prosperous, their safety assured. For 
had not Germany, France and England entered into a treaty to respect 
the neutrality of Belgium? 



14 GREAT BRITAIN AND THE WAR 

The German Emperor had pledged his Kingly word, and he broke it 
with never a thought of shame. The quickest way to strike at the heart 
of France was through Belgium ; Begium must either allow her territory 
to be violated or she would be crushed. When England remonstrated, 
when England protested against the infraction of the treaty guaranteeing 
the neutrality of Belgium, England was told that a treaty was merely a 
scrap of paper. So lightly did the German Emperor hold his honor. 

Gallant little Belgium ! To her honor was more than a scrap of paper. 
To her duty was more than the hypocrisy of a phrase. Confronted with 
the choice between safety bought at a price that only cowards would pay 
or freedom purchased at a price that might make the bravest hesitate, 
she did not flinch. She would fight. She might be conquered, but she 
would not be a craven. 

Belgium must be protected ; her safety must be assured ; she must be 
compensated for the wrongs she has suffered ; her cities must be rebuilt ; 
her starving and ruined people must be helped. Only in one way can 
this be done — Germany must be deprived of her power again to outrage 
Belgium ; for all the destruction that Germany has done, Germany must 
be made to pay. It would be a farce to rely on German "assurances," to 
place any faith in a treaty. Germany has shown she has no respect for 
treaties. She laughs at a scrap of paper. All that she respects is force; 
to her force is more to be respected than honor. To make peace now 
would be to hand over Belgium, racked and tortured, to the executioner. 
It would be disgraceful. It would be a greater infamy than Germany's 
infamous crime. 

The present generation is thrilled when it reads of battles and great 
deeds, the warm blood of youth is chilled when, with the ready response 
of youth, it reads of the dead and dying, the horrors of the battlefield, but 
youth cannot grasp what it means to a nation to be at war. It is the men 
of a former generation who understand. They know. They recall those 
four long, agonizing years, years that tried men's souls, that brought out 
all that was best and bravest in a people, when women with breaking 
hearts smiled through their tears and companioned by death lost not their 
courage, when men met disaster bravely and defeat made them only the 
more resolute. 

They were fighting for a great cause, and it sustained them. The 
same spirit animates England today. 

I desire to correct the statement that has so often been made in the 
German press and by Germans in high official position that England 



GREAT BRITAIN AND THE WAR 15 

wants to destroy Germany. Nothing could be farther from our thoughts. 
We have no grudge against Germany ; we English have no dislike of the 
Germans. What we want to destroy is German militarism. That is the 
only destruction we are determined to accomplish. 

Consider for a moment. Does any sensible man ruthlessly destroy his 
own property? Is it not only a fool who ruins his best customer? Would 
it not be the act of a madman to make himself poorer? This is the price 
England will pay were she so foolish to "destroy" Germany. English- 
men have millions of pounds invested in German enterprises, and Ger- 
man destruction means the loss of those investments. Germany was Eng- 
land's best customer, as England was Germany's best customer, and is 
it to be supposed that England would deliberately destroy her best mar- 
ket? Cannot everyone see that the greater the prosperity of Germany, the 
more Germany buys from England, the more England will sell to Ger- 
many ? Every ship Germany has put on the ocean ; every yard of goods 
Germany has sold in South America, in India, in Africa, in England ; 
every machine she has built, every pound of dyestuffs, every barrel of 
cement she has made ; everything that has kept her factories and her peo- 
ple profitably employed has been an extension of the world's commerce, has 
added to the wealth of the world, has made it possible for more people 
to buy the things that England manufactures, has made England richer. 

What can England make out of this war? Nothing, absolutely noth- 
ing. England's land hunger has long been satisfied, she has cast no cov- 
etous eyes on German colonies. Were Germany to pay an indemnity so 
huge that it would virtually reduce her to slavery, the millions would 
not compensate England for all that the war will cost her, for the loss of 
life, for the misery of women, for the tears of the fatherless, for the dislo- 
cation of commerce, for the impoverishment of the whole world. And 
when the world is poor England, because of her industrial and financial 
position, is the chief sufferer. 

The German people do not believe that England seeks their destruction, 
but German militarism must justify itself. Callous as the ruling class of 
Germany has always been to the opinion of the world, in this emergency, 
knowing it stands condemned, it craves the support of the United States, 
and in defence attributes to England base motives. 

We have put on our armor. We shall carry it through the heat of the 
day. Its burden is heavy, but we shall not take it off until men again 
breathe free, no longer affrighted by the terror of war. 

When that day comes we shall make peace. 



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